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Résumé / Abstract
On considère une classe de jeux dynamiques où l'évolution du stock est
une fonction hmogène du premier degré. Étant donné un jeu G avec le taux
d'actualisation r, on considère un équilibre Markov-parfait dont les stratégies sont
linéaires par rapport aux variables d'état. On montre que les sentiers des variables
de contrôle de cet équilibre constituent un équilibre en boucle ouverte d'un jeu G^ 
qui correspond à G, et qui a un taux d'actualisation r = r + k (k = constante). Dans^ 
le contexte d'un jeu d'exploitation de ressources naturelles, celà implique que
l'équilibre en boucle ouverte tends à conserver les ressources. Alternativement, on
considère un jeu G où le taux de dépréciation du stock est $ et où les stratégies de
l'équilibre Markov-parfait sont linéaires. On montre que les sentiers des variables
de contrôle donnent un équilibre en boucle ouverte d'un jeu G  dans laquelle le taux~ 
de dépréciation du stock est $ = $  + k. On obtient aussi un résultal dans l'autre~ 
direction: sous certaines hypothèses, on peut utiliser un équilibre en boucle ouverte
d'un jeu G pour construire un équilibre Markov-parfait d'un jeu modifié G .~
We consider a class of differential games with transition equations
that are homogeneous of degree one. For any game G with a discount rate r,
consider a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) with strategies that are linear in
the state variables. We show that the time paths of the control variables of this
equilibrium constitute an open-loop equilibrium of a corresponding game G  that^ 
differs from G only in that its rate of discount r is equal to r plus a suitably^ 
chosen constant. In the context of a resource depletion game, this implies that the
open-loop solution is more conservationist. In an alternative formulation, we
consider a game G with a rate of stock depreciation $, and a Markov perfect
equilibrium with strategies that are linear in the state variable. Then the
resulting equilibrium time paths of the control variables can be used to form an
open-loop equilibrium of a corresponding game G  with a rate of depreciation~ 
$ that is equal to $ plus a suitably chosen constant. The interpretation for the~ 
case of a resource game is similar. We also prove a converse result: under
certain assumptions, an open loop equilibrium of a differential game G can be
used to construct a MPE of a modified game G . This result is useful because it~ 
means a MPE can be found by first solving for an open loop equilibrium.
Mots Clés : Jeux différentiels, équilibre Markov-parfait, équilibre en boucle
ouverte
Keywords : Differential games, Markov perfect equilibria, open-loop equilibria
JEL : C72, C73, Q30
1 INTRODUCTION
In the dierential game litterature there is a time-honoured tradition
of comparing open-loop equilibria with closed -loop (or Markov per-
fect) ones. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, Sections 4.7 and 13.3) provide
a good overview. They oer several reasons why one might be inter-
ested in open- loop equlibria. First, these equilibria are relatively more
tractable. Second, they \serve as a useful benchmark for discussing the
eects of strategic incentives in the closed-loop information structure"
(op.cit., p131). Third, if there are many small players, open-loop equi-
libria are, under certain conditions, good approximation to closed-loop
ones. In various examples of dierential games involving a common
resource stock exploited by several players, it has been observed that
open-loop Nash equilibria tend to be more conservationist than Markov
Perfect Nash equilibria. See for example Clemhout and Wan (1995).
The intuition behind this is that if players use Markovian strategies that
specify extraction rates as functions of the current stock size, then each
knows that others will extract more, the greater is the current stock size.
So each will have little incentive for conservation, and will instead try
to reduce the stock at a rate faster than that which he would choose
if other players were committed to a given time path of extraction. It
seems however that no general theorem of this type has been proved.
The purpose of this note is to formalize the above intuition.
We consider a class of dierential games with transition equations
that are homogeneous of degree one in the control and state variables.
Each player has an objective function that is homogeneous of degree 
i
.
Under these conditions, it is known (see Long and Shimomura (1995))
that a player's best reply to his opponents' Markovian strategies is ho-
mogeneous of degree one in the state variables, if their strategies are
homogenous of degree one. Assume there exists a Markov perfect Nash
equilibrium with linear strategies for a gameG where the rate of discount
of player i is r
i
. In Section 2 we show that the resulting time paths of the
control variables constitute an open-loop equilibrium of a corresponding
game
^
G that is identical to G except for the discount rates: the discount
rate r^
i
in game
^
G is equal to r
i
plus a constant. When this constant is
positive, which is the case in resource depletion games, this result implies
that open-loop Nash (or OLN) equilibria are more conservationist than
Markov perfect Nash (or MPN) equilibria.
An alternative, though not equivalent, way of comparing the out-
comes of OLN equilibria with MPN equilibria is via the introduction of
a depreciation rate. This is examined in Section 3, where we consider a
game G with a depreciation rate . We show that for every MPN equilib-
1
rium with linear strategies, there exists a corresponding OLN equilibrium
of a game
~
G with a depreciation rate
~
 (equal  plus a constant), such
that the ratio of the control to the state variable along this OLN equi-
librium path is identical to the ratio of the control to the state variable
in the MPN equilibrium. Again, in the context of a resource depletion
game, the interpretation is that OLN equilibria are more conservationist
than the MPN equilibria.
In Section 4, we show that under certain assumptions, the converse
of the result reported in Section 2 can be proved. Starting from an open-
loop equilibrium of a game G, we can construct a MPN equilibrium of
a corresponding game
~
G. This result can be helpful when one searches
for MPNE of some game
~
G, because in general it is easier to compute
an open-loop equilibrium.
2 THE MODEL
We consider a continuous time dierential game with N players. Let
c
i
2 R
m
denote the vector of control variables for player i. Let s 2
R
n
+
denote the vector of state variables. The evolution of the state
variables is governed by the following transition equations, written in
vector notation,
_s = g(s; c
1
;    ; c
N
) = g(s; c) (1)
where c = (c
1
;    ; c
N
): Each player has a utility function
u
i
= f
i
(s; c
1
;    ; c
N
) = f
i
(s; c) (2)
and his payo is:
J
i
=
Z
1
0
f
i
(s; c
1
;    ; c
N
)D
i
(t)dt (3)
where D
i
(t) = exp( r
i
t);and r
i
is a positive number representing player
i's rate of discount.
The control variables must be chosen to satisfy a set of constraints:
h(s; c
1
;    ; c
N
)  0 (4)
These inequalities may be simply non-negativity constraints on the con-
trols, or more generally technological or institutional restrictions. For
example, in a common property resource model, one may want to specify
that the sum of extraction rates must not exceed a maximum available
ow which is a linear function of the stock. (This specication would
also ensure that extractions are zero when the stock is exhausted.)
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A Markovian strategy for player i is a function m
i
that determines
for each pair (s(t); t) the value of the control vector c
i
(t): A Marko-
vian strategy that does not contain s(t) as an argument is called an
open-loop strategy. We will use the supercript 0 to denote an open-loop
strategy. Given the initial stock s(0), a prole of open-loop strategies
 m
0
1
;    ;m
0
N
;denoted by m
0
, is said to be feasible if the constraints
h(s; c
1
;    ; c
N
)  0 are satised for all t. The payo to player i under
this prole is denoted J
i
(s(0);m
0
): Let  m
0
 i
; ~m
0
i
 denote an alter-
native open-loop prole constructed from m
0
by replacing m
0
i
with ~m
0
i
:
The prole m
0
is said to be an open-loop Nash equilibrium given s(0)
if no player i can nd an alternative feasible prole  m
0
 i
; ~m
0
i
 such
that his payo is improved, that is, such that J
i
(s(0); m
0
 i
; ~m
0
i
) >
J
i
(s(0);m
0
): It is well known that open-loop Nash equilibria are time-
consistent, in the sense that at any time   0, given that all players
have followed their open-loop strategies, no player has an incentive to
deviate from his strategy. Open-loop Nash equilibria are however not
subgame perfect. That is, if for some reason some player j has devi-
ated from his strategy, so that the actual value of s() is dierent from
the one predicted by player i who initially assumed that no deviation
would occur, then in general it will no longer be in player i' s interest
to continue playing his original strategy. For this reason, the predictive
power of open-loop Nash equilibria has been seriously questioned. Such
equilibria are credible only if all players can commit themselves from the
start to stick to their open-loop strategies.
The apparent weakness of the concept of open-loop Nash equilib-
rium has led economists to favour the concept of Markov perfect Nash
equilibrium. (See Fudenberg and Tirole(1991, Chapter 13) for a compre-
hensive review.) A prole of Markovian strategies m = m
1
;    ;m
N

is said to be a Markov perfect Nash (MPN) equilibrium if at any time
  t, given any valued s() which is feasible under the initial condition
s(0);no player i can nd an alternative feasible strategy ~m
i
that would
yield him a better payo for the remaining portion of the game, given
that all other players stick to their original Markovian strategies.
Given that all the functions f
i
; g and h do not depend on t explicitly,
it is reasonable to focus on Markov perfect Nash equilibria that consist
of strategies that are time-independent. Such strategies are called sta-
tionary Markovian strategies. The following result, proved in Long and
Shimomura (1995), will be useful:
Proposition 1. If f
i
is homogeneous of degree 
i
 1, and if both g
and h are homogeneous of degree one in (s; c) then player i' s best reply
to stationary Markovian strategies that are homogeneous of degree one
3
in s is itself stationary and homogeneous of degree one in s, and his
payo J
i
is homogeneous of degree 
i
in s:
Note that the above proposition does not assert existence, which is
a quite dierent matter. In what follows, we attempt to relate MPN
equilibria to OLN equilibria. We adopt the following assumptions which
are more restrictive than those stated in Proposition 1.
Assumption A1: f
i
(s; c
1
; :::; c
N
) is concave and homogenous of
degree 
i
in (s; c
1
; :::; c
N
) and 0 < 
i
< 1
Assumption A2: There is only one state variable, denoted by s;
(s  0):
Assumption A3: g(s; c
1;
:::; c
N
) and h(s; c
1
; :::; c
N
) are concave and
homogenous of degree one in (s; c
1
; :::; c
N
)
We shall refer to this game as Game G;and assume that there exists
a Markov perfect Nash equilibrium with linear strategies:
c
i
= 
i
s (5)
where 
i
2 R
m
:Given s(0); we can compute the realized time paths s

(t)
and c

(t). It would seem natural to ask the following question: if all
players were required to play only open-loop strategies, would there be
an open-loop Nash equilibrium with a time path for the state variable
that lies entirely above s

(t) for all positive t ? That is, can we expect
that for any Markov perfect Nash equilibrium of the above game, there
exists a more conservationist time path that is supported by open-loop
strategies? If the answer to that question is in the armative, one
may reasonably advocate a government policy that makes open-loop
equilibria credible. For example, a policy that prevents players from
observing the value of the state variable would do the job.
Instead of asking the above question, it is convenient to phrase the
question somewhat dierently: Can we modify Game G by adding a
suitably chosen constant to the rate of discount of each player, in such
a way that the realized time paths s

(t) and c

(t) of the Markov perfect
equilibrium of Game G coincide with the open-loop Nash equilibrium of
the modied game ? We now prepare the groundwork for answering this
question.
By denition, if s

(t) and c

(t) are realized time paths of a MPN
equilibrium, then for each player i, the time path c

i
(t) must satisfy the
necessary conditions of the following optimal control problem. Find a
time path c
i
(t) that maximizes
J
i
=
Z
1
0
f
i
(s; 
1
s;    ; 
i 1
s; c
i;

i+1
s;    ; 
N
s)D
i
(t)dt (6)
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subject to
_s = g(s; 
1
s;    ; 
i 1
s; c
i;

i+1
s;    ; 
N
s) (7)
s(0) = s
0
(8)
h(s; 
1
s;    ; 
i 1
s; c
i;

i+1
s;    ; 
N
s)  0 (9)
The Hamiltonian for this problem is:
H
i
= f
i
+ 
i
g
and the corresponding Lagrangian is:
L
i
= H
i
+ 
i
h
where 
i
is a non-negative vector of Lagrange multipliers . The necessary
conditions are (7), (9), (8), and
@f
i
@c
i
+ 
i
@g
@c
i
+ 
i
@h
@c
i
= 0 (10)

i
h(s

; 
1
s

;    ; 
i 1
s

; c

i;

i+1
s

;    ; 
N
s

) = 0
_
i
= r
i

i
 
@f
i
(s

; c

)
@s
  
i
@g(s

; c

)
@s
  
i
@h(s

; c

)
@s
  
i
(11)
where 
i
is dened as

i
=
X
j 6=i

j

@f
i
(s

; c

)
@c
j
+ 
i
@g(s

; c

)
@c
j
+ 
i
@h(s

; c

)
@c
j

(12)
In addition, we assume that the usual transversality conditions are
satised:
lim
t!1
exp( r
i
t)
i
(t)s

(t) = 0 (13)
lim
t!1
exp( r
i
t)
i
(t)  0 (14)
Let  = (
1
;    ; 
N
). Since c
i
= 
i
s and all the partial derivatives in
(12) are homogeneous of degree zero in (s; c); clearly 
i
can be expressed
as:

i
=
X
j 6=i

j

@f
i
(1; )
@c
j
+ 
i
@g(1; )
@c
j
+ 
i
@h(1; )
@c
j

(15)
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In the special case where the constraint (9) is not binding and where each
player's utility function does not have other players's control variables
as arguments, then
 

i

i
=  
X
j 6=i

j
@g(1; )
@c
j
 
i
(16)
We are now ready to state our main result
Proposition 2. Let c
i
= 
i
s for i = 1;    ; N be a MPN equilibrium
strategy prole for the game G where player i's discount rate is r
i
and
let s

(t) and c

(t) be the resulting equilibrium time paths of the state
and control variables. Then c

(t) is an open-loop Nash equilibrium for
a modied game
^
G which would be identical to G except that for each
player the discount rate is now r
i
+ 
i
; where 
i
is given by (16). This
equivalence holds under the assumptions that (i) A1, A2, and A3 hold,
(ii) the constraint h is not binding, (iii) each player's utility function
depends only on the state variable and his control variables, (iv) the
transversality conditions (13) and (14) are satised.
Proof : Substitute (16) into (11). The resulting equation, together
with (10), (13), (7), (9), and (8), are necessary and sucient for an
open-loop Nash equilibria.
Remark 1: If
@g
@c
i
is negative for all c
i
, then we may interprete the
control variables as extraction rates and the state variable as a stock of
resource, and call the game a Common Access Resource Game. In
this case we would expect all 
i
to be positive and therefore 
i
would
be positive. It follows that a MPN equilibrium of a common property
game G yields an equilibrium play that is identical to that given by an
OLN equilibrium of a related game
^
G where each player has a higher
rate of discount. In this sense, MPN equilibria are less conservationist
than OLN equilibria.
Example 1:A common pool problemwith heterogeneous play-
ers.
Let s denote a stock of natural resource exploited by N players with
dierent rates of discount (r
i
6= r
j
) and dierent utility functions.We
specify the functions g and f
i
as follows:
g(s; c) = as 
N
X
i=1
c
i
6
and f
i
(s; c) = c

i
i
where 
i
2 (0; 1) ; r
i
 a  0;and each c
i
is a non-
negative real number. First let us check that there exists a unique MPN
equilibrium in linear strategies. Let 
i
denote the costate variable, and
assume an interior solution. The necessary conditions for player i's con-
trol problem are

i
c

i
 1
i
= 
i
_
i
= r
i

i
  a
i
+ 
i
X
j 6=i
@c
i
@s
_s = as 
N
X
i=1
c
i
Substituting c
j
= 
j
s; we have

i
(
i
s)

i
 1
= 
i
(17)
_
i
= 
i
0
@
r
i
  a+
X
j 6=i

j
1
A
(18)
_s = s
 
a 
N
X
i=1

j
!
(19)
Equation (17) yields
  (1  
i
)
_s
s
=
_
i

i
(20)
Substituting (18) and (19) into (20), we obtain
r
i
  
i
a = (1  
i
) 
i
  
i
X
j 6=i

j
(21)
Since the preceeding equation must hold for all i, we have the matrix
equation
0
B
B
@
1  
1
 
1
    
1
 
2
1       
2
           
 
N
 
N
   1  
N
1
C
C
A
0
B
B
@

1

2
  

N
1
C
C
A
=
0
B
B
@
r
1
  a
1
r
2
  a
2
  
r
N
  a
N
1
C
C
A
(22)
Clearly if
P

i
is less than unity and a
i
is less than r
i
then this
matrix equation has a unique and positive solution (
1
;    ; 
N
). (See
Takayama(1985, Theorem 4.C.4).) Finally, it is easy to check that the
transversality conditions (13) and (14) are satised, because
d ln(s
i
exp( r
i
t))
dt
=  
i
.
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3 An Alternative Formulation
We now introduce an alternative way of comparing MPN equilibria and
OLN equilibria. Instead of thinking in terms of an adjustment to the
discount rate, let us modify game G by adding a natural rate of de-
preciation of the stock. Recall that in game G, the state variable is s;
and _s = g(s; c); where c = (c
1
;    ; c
N
) , and c
i
is a vector of m control
variables, and s is a real number. Consider an alternative environment
~
G in which the state variable is subject to an additional decay. To avoid
possible confusion, in this environment the state variable is denoted by
y; and the vector of control variables for player i is denoted by a
i
. We
assume _y = g(y; a) y; where  is the rate of decay. The utility function
of player i is f(y; a
i
), where f is homogeneous of degree  ,  2 (0; 1):
In addition we assume that all players have the same rate of discount, r
, and the functional form of f is the same for all i. For simplicity, the
constraints on the control variables are just non-negativity constraints:
The following result is quite analogous to Proposition 2. The assump-
tions (i) through (iv) of Proposition 2 are maintained in the following
Proposition as well.
Proposition 3. Assume that Game G has a symmetric MPN equi-
librium with linear strategies c
i
= 
i
s , where 
i
= (
i1
;    ; 
im
) and

i
= 
j
for all players i; j = 1;    ; N: Denote the resulting time paths of
the control and state variables by c

i
(t) and s

(t) . Dene
 =
(1 N)

m
X
k=1

ik
@g(1; 
1
;    ; 
N
)
@c
ik
(23)
Consider now a corresponding game
~
G in which the transition equation
for the state variable is _y = g(y; a) y, where  is given by equation (23).
Then we can construct for the game
~
G an open-loop Nash equilibrium
a
0
i
(t) and the resulting time path for the state variable, y
0
(t); by using
c

i
(t) and s

(t) :
a
0
i
(t) = c

i
(t) exp( t)
y
0
(t) = s

(t) exp( t)
It follows that the ratio
a
0
i
(t)
y
0
(t)
for game
~
G is equal to the ratio
c

i
(t)
s

(t)
for
the original game G:
Remark 2: For games with common access resources, Remark 1 of the
8
preceeding section applies here, so we expect  to be positive. Then
Proposition 2 may be interpreted as implying that MPN equilibria are
less conservationist than OLN ones in the sense that despite a higher
rate of decay in game
~
G; the ratio of consumption to stock in the OLN
equilibrium of this game is the same as that of the MPN equilibrium of
the original game G:
Proof: To nd an open-loop solution for the game
~
G, we form the
Hamiltonian
H
i
= f(y; a
i
) + 
i
[g(y; a
1
;    ; a
N
)  y] (24)
The necessary conditions are
@f(y; a
0
i
)
@a
i
=  
i
@g(y; a
0
1
;    ; a
0
N
)
@a
i
(25)
_

i
= 
i
(r + ) 
@f(y; a
i
)
@y
  
i
@g(y; a
1
;    ; a
N
)
@y
(26)
_y = g(y; a
1
;    ; a
N
)  y (27)
and the transversality conditions are
lim
t!1

i
exp( rt)  0 (28)
lim
t!1

i
exp( rt)y(t) = 0 (29)
Now by assumption the original game G has a symmetric MPN equi-
librium, with c
i
= 
i
s: Therefore for player i, there exists a time path
of the costate variable associated with s

(t);denoted by 
i
(t); such that
the following conditions hold (where for all j 6= i; c

j
stands for 
j
s

):
@f(s

; c

i
)
@c
i
=  
i
@g(s

; c

1
;    ; c

N
)
@c
i
(30)
_
i
= 
i
r 
@f(s

; c

i
)
@s
 
i
@g(s

; c

1
;    ; c

N
)
@s
 
i
X
j 6=i

j
@g(s

; c

1
;    ; c

N
)
@c
j
(31)
_s

= g(s

; c

1
;    ; c

N
) (32)
lim
t!1

i
exp( rt)  0 (33)
lim
t!1

i
exp( rt)s

(t) = 0 (34)
Let us dene

i
(t)  
i
(t) exp((1  )t)
9
ai
(t)  c

i
(t) exp( t)
y(t)  s

(t) exp( t)
Substituting these variables into (30), (31), and (32), and using the fact
that the partial derivatives of f are homogeneous of degree    1; and
the partial derivatives of g are homogeneous of degree zero, we obtain
the conditions (25), (26), and (27). Furthermore, conditions (33) and
(34) imply that the transversality conditions (28) and (29) are satised
provided that r+2 is positive. It follows that by construction we have
found an OLN equilibrium for the game
~
G:2
Example 2: Exploitation of a resource stock when utility
depends on both stock and ow.
Let s be a common property resource and c
i
be player i's rate of
extraction ( a non-negative real number). Assume _s =  
P
N
i=1
c
i
: Player
i maximizes the integral of discounted utility
Z
1
o
(sc
i
)
=2
exp( rt)dt
where r > 0; and N < 2: It is easy to verify that the following strategy
for all players constitutes a MPN equilibrium:
c
i
=
rs
2 N
This yields the realized time paths
s

(t) = s(0) exp

 rNt
2 N

c

i
(t) =
rs(0)
2 N
exp

 rNt
2 N

Now let us consider a modied game, denoted by
~
G, where the state
variable is y, the extraction rates are a
i
; i = 1;    ; N , where a
i
is a real
number, and there is a decay rate ; so that _y =  y 
P
N
i=1
a
i
. Applying
Proposition 3, we claim that if  =
 
N 1



r
2 N

then the following
time paths of the control variable a
i;
(i = 1;    ; N), constitute an OLN
equilibrium:
a
i
(t) =
ry(0)
2 N
exp

 rN
2 N
  

t (35)
The resulting time path of the state variable is
y(t) = y(0) exp

 rN
2 N
  

t (36)
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The ratio a
i
(t)=y(t) is thus equal to the ratio c
i
(t)=s(t) in the MPN
equilibrium of the original game G. Finally, for the OLN equilibrium of
game
~
G, the time path of the co-state variable is

i
(t) =

2
[a
i
(t)y(t)]
=2
a
i
(t)
 1
It satises the condition
_

i
(t) = (r + )
i
 

2
(a
i
y)
=2
y
 1
The transversality conditions are also satised.
4 A Converse Result
In this Section we seek to prove the converse of Proposition 2. Here
we begin with an OLN equilibrium of a certain game G, and use it to
construct aMPN equilibrium of a corresponding game
~
G. We hope that
this result is a useful beginning step for the search of MPN equilibria,
because OLN equilibria are typically easier to nd.
Let us consider the problem of nding an OLN equilibrium for a game
G where player i's seeks a time path c
i
(t) that maximizes
Z
1
0
f
i
(s; c
1
; :::; c
N
) exp( r
i
t)dt; i = 1; :::; N
subject to
_s = g(s; c
1
; :::; c
N
); s(0) = s
0
h(s; c
1
; :::; c
N
)  0
Player i takes the time paths c
j
(t) as given for all j 6= i. The assumptions
A1, A2, and A3 are maintained.
Consider the following system of equations
@f
i
(1; 
1
; :::; 
N
)
@c
i
+ 
i
@g(1; 
1
; :::; 
N
)
@c
i
= 0 i = 1; :::; N (37)
r
i

i
 
@f
i
(1; 
1
; :::; 
N
)
@s
 
i
@g(1; 
1
; :::; 
N
)
@s
+(1 
i
)
i
g(1; 
1
; :::; 
N
) = 0
(38)
(also, i = 1; :::; N), where 
i
and 
i
(i = 1; :::; N), are unknowns.
Assumption 4: The system of equations (37) and (38) has a solu-
tion (

1
; :::; 

N
; 

1
; :::; 

N
) where 

i
 0, i = 1; :::; N .
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Assumption 5: h(1; 

1
; :::; 

N
) > 0 and r
i
> (2 
i
)g(1; 

1
; :::; 

N
).
Let s

(t) be the solution of the dierential equation
_s = g(s; 

1
s; :::; 

N
s); s(0) = s
0
(39)
Then
s

(t) = s
0
exp[g(1; 

)t] (40)
Lemma 1: Assume A1-A5 hold. The following time paths for the
control variables constitute an OLNE for the game G.
c

i
(t) = 

i
s

(t) = s
0
exp[g(1; 

)t]
Proof: Dene 

i
= [s

]

i
 1


i
. It is easy to verify that the following
sucient conditions of an OLN equilibrium are satised:
H
i
= f
i
(s; c
1
; :::; c
N
) + 

i
g(s; c
1
; :::; c
N
)
@H
i
@c
i
= 0
_


i
= r
i


i
 
@H
i
@s
lim
t!1


i
(t) exp( r
i
t)  0
lim
t!1


i
(t) exp( r
i
t)s

(t) = 0
(notice that _s=s = g(1; 

1
; :::; 

N
)
and therefore
_

i
=
i
= (1  
i
)g(1; 

1
; :::; 

N
):)2
We now show that there exists discount rates r^
i
(i = 1; :::; N) such
that the strategies c
i
(s) = 

i
s (i = 1; :::; N) constitute a MPN equilib-
rium for a modied dierential game
~
G which corresponds to the initial
game G except for the modied discount rates.
First, in view of (37), c
i
(s)  

i
s is the maximizer of the Hamilto-
nian
H

i
= f
i
(s; 

1
s; :::; 

i 1
s; c
i
; 

i+1
; :::; 

N
)+

i
g(s; 

1
s; :::; 

i 1
s; c
i
; 

i+1
; :::; 

N
)
where


i
 

i
s

i
 1
(41)
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Now, assume that f
i
is a function of s and c
i
only. Then, if 

i
and s
satisfy
_


i
= r^
i


i
  f
i
s
(s; c
i
)  

i
g
s
(s; s)  

i
X
j 6=i


j
g
j
(s; 

s) (42)
and
_s = sg(1; 

)
where 

denotes the vector (

1
; :::; 

N
), then c
i
(s) = 

i
s, i = 1; :::N ,
are MPN strategies for the game
~
G. We now verify that (42) is indeed
satised. In view of (41), condition (42) can be written as
_


i
= 

i
2
4
r^
i
  (

i
)
 1
f
i
s
(1; 

i
)s

i
 1
  g
s
(1; 

) 
X
j 6=i


j
g
j
(1; 

)
3
5
(43)
or
_


i
= 

i
2
4
r^
i
  (

i
)
 1
f
i
s
(1; 

i
)  g
s
(1; 

) 
X
j 6=i


j
g
j
(1; 

)
3
5
(44)
Since 

i
is time-invariant by A4, (41) gives
_


i
=

i
= (
i
  1) _s=s =
(
i
  1)g(1; 

). Therefore (44) holds if and only if
(
i
  1)g(1; 

) = r^
i
  (

i
)
 1
f
i
s
(1; 

i
)  g
s
(1; 

) 
X
j 6=i


j
g
j
(1; 

) (45)
In view of (38), condition (45) holds if and only if
r^
i
= r
i
+
X
j 6=i


j
g
j
(1; 

)  r
i
  
i
(46)
We have thus proved the following proposition:
Proposition 4: Under Assumptions A1-A5, the dierential game
G has the following OLN solution
c
i
(t) = 

i
s
0
exp[g(1; 

)t]; i = 1; :::; N
and the evolution of the state variable along the equilibrium play is
s(t) = s
0
exp[g(1; 

)t]
Consider the modied game
~
G which would be identical to G except
that for each player the discount rate is now r
i
  
i
. Then, under the
additional assumption that each player's utility function depends only
on the state variable and his control variables, this modied game has a
MPN equilibrium where player i's strategy is c
i
(s) = 

i
s, i = 1; :::; N .
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5 Concluding remarks
Propositions 2, 3 and 4 can be easily extended to accommodate the case
where the integrand is the logarithmic function. Recall that if f
i
is ho-
mogenous of degree 
i
then marginal utility is homogenous of degree

i
  1. In the case of a logarithmic utility function, marginal utility is
homogenous of degree  1. It follows that the only modication is we
must replace 
i
by 0: The linear policy function c
i
= 
i
s remains appli-
cable, because, as shown in Long and Shimomura (1995), the best reply
to a linear strategy is also linear when the utility function is logarthmic.
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